

TRANSMITT. SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>PWV</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>Paul -</i> <i>Thought you'd be</i> <i>interested in glancing</i> <i>at this.</i> <i>Gen. Inocott has</i> <i>action responsibility. He's</i> <i>working with Angleton and</i>		
FROM: <i>George of DDP</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
<i>Please return.</i>		

7 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : NSC Planning Board Discussion of 7 June 1957 re DOD
Proposal on National Policy on Counter-intelligence
and the Establishment of a Committee to Implement
Such Policy

1. Karl Harr (DOD) spoke briefly to the following points:

a. There was an urgent need for a hard look at the problem of
coordination in the field of counter-intelligence;

b. Similarly there was a need for clarifying national policy
in the field;

c. The best way to examine these problems was to request the
DCI, in consultation with the IAC, to study them and forward recom-
mendations to the NSC, including appropriate revisions of applicable
NSCID's.

2. General Erskine (DOD) spoke from a paper, which will be circulated
to NSC members, as follows:

a. The JCS merely wanted to get the problem out in the open --
did not necessarily desire more interagency meetings.

b. There is no accepted definition of counter-intelligence.
The JCS definition is a very broad one, and in the JCS view there is
no single agency with assigned responsibility for all activities in
the JCS definition, nor any single point in the Government to which
the JCS can turn for national policy guidance in the entire field of
counter-intelligence.

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c. Cited several problems which the JCS could not solve or had difficulty in solving. These included: CINCLANT's efforts to reach agreement in 1951 for a delimitation of counter-intelligence responsibilities in Iceland; national policy re listening devices; and resolution of US policy and implementation responsibilities in counter-intelligence in NATO and SEATO. Clearance had to be obtained from JIC, JCS, IAC and OSD, producing unacceptable confusion and delay.

d. Concurred in Harr's proposal, but emphasized that, although foreign counter-intelligence problems and policy must be cleared up first, these would affect and be affected by domestic considerations.

3. Mr. Amory concurred in Mr. Harr's proposed method of handling the issue, and elaborated on the DCI's letter of 4 June to Mr. Lay, pointing in particular to the fact that none of the problems raised by General Erskine had ever been referred to the IAC, the close interrelationship between counter-intelligence and other phases of intelligence activities, the monolithic nature of Soviet Bloc intelligence activities, and the constant need for centralized control over all phases of foreign intelligence, including counter-intelligence. Mr. Amory also said this was an appropriate time to study the matter, inasmuch as the intelligence community was currently reviewing all the NSCID's and that NSCID No. 5 was particularly applicable to the counter-intelligence problem.

4. Representatives of State, Budget, Treasury, ODM, IIC and ICIS all concurred in Mr. Harr's proposal.

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5. Mr. Lay said he would thus refer the matter to the DCI, so inform the NSC, and circulate to NSC members copies of all agency comments to the original DOD proposal, including the paper circulated at the Planning Board by General Erskine.

ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

cc: Mr. Wisner
General Truscott
Mr. Angleton

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